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THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
The supreme court had before it during the period in ques-
tion three cases involving the law of insurance. In Bankston v.
Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association' it permitted
recovery by a plaintiff on a sick and accident policy over ob-
jection by the defendant that materially false answers had been
made; that the disability antedated the policy; that it was the
result of insanity; that it did not confine the defendant indoors
within the terms of the policy. The case of Clesi v. National Life
and Accident Insurance Company2 was distinguished on the
ground that in the case before the court, the plaintiff was inca-
pacitated from pursuing any gainful occupation notwithstanding
that he was occasionally permitted to leave home to visit the
doctor and to take exercise necessary to prevent physical de-
terioration. This feature of the case seems to be a realistic ap-
plication of the provision in question. The case is not entirely
convincing, however, in its treatment of the defense that the
disability was the result of insanity. On this point the court
seemed to be influenced by the fact that the plaintiff had periods
of lucidity notwithstanding that he had suffered hallucinations
and delusions. The court recognized expert opinion to the effect
that paresis generally progressively deteriorates the brain tissues
and will end in insanity if it is not arrested by proper treatment.
This leads one to wonder if the possibility that such a condition
might develop should not have justified some effort to protect
the defendant against that sort of contingency, inasmuch as in
the policy provision dealing with insanity there was no limita-
tion based on the manner in which it might be brought about.
In Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Com-
panya the cases of Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Company4
and Matney v. Blue Ribbon5 allowing non-resident married
women to sue the insurer of the husband under Act 55 of 1930
where the accidents occurred in Louisiana were held not to
justify suit by a resident married woman under the authority of
the act in question where the accident occurred in Mississippi.
The theory applied by the court was that the act creates a sub-
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 208 La. 1008, 24 So.(2d) 59 (1945).
2. 195 I. 736, 197 So. 413 (1940).
3. 209 La. 495, 24 So.(2d) 875 (1946).
4. 52 La. Ann. 417, 27 So. 851 (1900).
5. 202 La. 505, 12 So.(2d) 253 (1942).
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stantive right in favor of a married woman only if the accident
occurs here. This was based on the rule that the law of the place
where the accident occurs determines the substantive rights aris-
ing therefrom. The court's disposition of the case is believed to
be a consistent application of the original holding that the act
created a cause of action in favor of the wife.
The State Department of Highways was held to be a "per-
son" and therefore entitled to a direct action against the insurers
of a steamship company umder the provision of Act 253 of 1918
as amended by Act 55 of 1930, in Department of Highways v.
Lykes Brothers S. S. Company, Incorporated.6 The general rule
was applied that the word "person" as used in a statute is to be
held to include corporations where such bodies fall within the
reason and purpose of the act.
VI. PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
Original Jurisdiction
Glover v. Mayer, presents interesting but futile efforts of
plaintiff to resist the force of defendant's exception to the juris-
diction ratione personae of the trial court. A suit to recover
plaintiff's share under an alleged profit-sharing agreement for
the operation of defendant's plantation was instituted in the
parish where the latter was situated, rather than that where
defendant was domiciled. Defendant's exception was resisted by
plaintiff through the arguments: (1) that the alleged contract
constituted a partnership between the two litigants, and hence
the suit was properly brought in the parish where the partner-
ship was established;2 and (2) that the action was one to recover
for "labor performed" on a plantation within the intendment of
the statute permitting such suits to be brought in the parish
where the plantation was situated. In affirming the decision
maintaining defendant's exception, the appellate court swept
both contentions aside through the application of the principle
that exceptions to the general rule of suit at defendant's domicile
were strictly construed. Since the petition alleged no facts show-
6. 209 La. 881, 24 So.(2d) 623 (1945).
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